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Abstract
We study locally differentially private (LDP) bandits learning in this paper. First, we propose simple
black-box reduction frameworks that can solve a large family of context-free bandits learning problems
with LDP guarantee. Based on our frameworks, we can improve previous best results for private bandits
learning with one-point feedback, such as private Bandits Convex Optimization etc, and obtain the first
results for Bandits Convex Optimization (BCO) with multi-point feedback under LDP. LDP guarantee
and black-box nature make our frameworks more attractive in real applications compared with previous
specifically designed and relatively weaker differentially private (DP) context-free bandits algorithms.
Further, we also extend our algorithm to Generalized Linear Bandits with regret bound O˜(T 3/4/ε) under
(ε, δ)-LDP which is conjectured to be optimal. Note given existing Ω(T ) lower bound for DP contextual
linear bandits [34], our result shows a fundamental difference between LDP and DP contextual bandits
learning.
1 Introduction
As a quite general and powerful model, (contextual) bandits learning has attracted lots of attentions
both in theoretical study and real applications [9, 27], from personalized recommendation to clinical trails.
However, existing algorithms designed for these applications heavily rely on users’ sensitive data, and an off-
the-shelf use of such algorithms may leak users’ privacy and bring concerns to future users for sharing their
data with related institutions or corporations. For example, in classification or regression tasks, we update
our model according to the feature and label of each user. In Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB), we estimate
underlying rewards of all arms based on user’s feedback. A solid notion of data privacy is Differential
Privacy (DP) proposed by Dwork et al. [13] in 2006. Since then, differentially private bandits learning has
been studied extensively.
Among context-free bandits learning, Bandits Convex Optimization (BCO) is one of the fundamental
problems. Thakurta and Smith [36] designed the first (ε, δ)-differentially private adversarial BCO algorithm
with O˜ (T 3/4/ε) regret for convex loss and O˜ (T 2/3/ε) regret for strongly convex loss, which nearly match
current non-private best BCO bounds under the same conditions [3, 16] 1. However, when loss functions are
further smooth, current best non-private bounds for convex/strongly convex bandits are O˜ (T 2/3) [31] and
O˜ (T 1/2) [20] respectively, and previous approaches [36, 5] seem hard to achieve such regret bounds in the
same setting under privacy constraint (see Section 3.1 for more discussions). Besides BCO and its extension
to multi-points feedback [3], context-free bandits also include other important cases, such as Multi-Armed
Bandits (MAB) etc, and there have been lots of algorithms designed for differentially private MAB [36, 30, 38,
37, 5, 32], either in stochastic or adversarial environment. As one can see, there are many different settings
in context-free bandits learning, and existing differentially private algorithms are carefully designed for each
1Though Bubeck, Lee, and Eldan [8] designed a polynomial time algorithm for general BCO with O˜(T 1/2) regret, it is far
from practical, so we don’t consider its result in this paper, but of course we can plug that algorithm into our framework to
obtain optimal O˜(T 1/2/ε) bound for general private BCO.
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Type Problem Our Regret Bound Best Non-Private Regret
Context-Free
BCO
Convex O˜ (T 3/4/ε) O˜ (T 3/4) [16]
Convex + Smooth O˜ (T 2/3/ε) O˜ (T 2/3) [31]
S.C O˜ (T 2/3/ε) O˜ (T 2/3) [3]
S.C + Smooth O˜ (T 1/2/ε) O˜ (T 1/2) [20]
MP-BCO
Convex O˜ (T 1/2/ε) O˜ (T 1/2) [3]
Strongly Convex O˜ (logT/ε) O˜ (logT ) [3]
Context-Based
Contextual Linear Bandits O˜(T 3/4/ε) O˜(T 1/2) [2]
Generalize Linear Bandits O˜(T 3/4/ε) O˜(T 1/2) [28]
Table 1: Summary of our main results under (ε, δ)-LDP, where O˜ notation hides dependence over dimension
d and other poly-logarithmic factors. (S.C means Strongly Convex, MP means Multi-Point)
one of them, which makes them relatively inconvenient to be used. Besides, their theoretical performance is
analyzed separately and rather complicated. Some of them don’t match corresponding non-private results.
Different with the setting in context-free bandits, usually there are certain contexts in real applications,
such as user profile that contains user’s features. Advanced bandit model uses these contexts explicitly to
find the corresponding best action at each round, which is called contextual bandits. Two representative
ones are contextual linear bandits [29] and Generalized Linear Bandits [15]. Given benefits of contextual
bandits, one may also wish to design corresponding private mechanisms. However, Shariff and Sheffet [34]
proved that any contextual bandit algorithm under DP guarantee would cause an Ω(T ) regret bound. Hence,
they considered a relaxed definition of DP called joint differential privacy, and proposed an algorithm based
on LinUCB [2] with regret bound O˜ (T 1/2/ε) [34] under ε-joint differential privacy.
Note all of previous study focus on differential privacy guarantee or its relaxed version. Compared with
Differential Privacy, most of time Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [25, 11] is a much stronger and user-
friendly standard of privacy and is more appealing in real applications [10], as LDP requires protecting each
user’s data before collection.
For context-free bandits, it is not hard to see algorithms with LDP guarantee protects DP automatically.
However in contextual bandits, things become more delicate and these two definitions are not comparable,
as they have different interpretations about the output sequence. In detail, DP regards predicted actions
for contexts as the output sequence. Since optimal action varies from round to round in contextual bandits,
it is not surprising there is a lower bound of linear regret in this case [34], as DP always requires outputs
to be nearly the same for any two neighboring datasets/contexts, which contradicts with the personalized
prediction in contextual bandits. In contrast, LDP regards the collected information from users as “output
sequence” and has no restriction on predicted actions, which is more reasonable as these actions are predicted
on the local side and will not be released to public. Therefore, LDP seems like a more appropriate standard
for contextual bandits compared with DP, and maybe there is hope to bypass the lower bound proved for
DP contextual bandits.
Given above discussions, a natural question arises: can we design simple and effective algorithms for
bandits learning with LDP guarantee?
Our Contributions: In this work, we study both context-free bandits 2 and contextual bandits with
LDP guarantee. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (see Table 1 for more details)
(1) We propose a simple reduction framework motivated by Agarwal and Singh [5] for a large class of
context-free bandits learning problems with LDP guarantee, including BCO, MAB and Best Arm Identi-
fication (see Section 3.1 and Appendix B). Equipped with different non-private algorithms, the utility of
our framework can match corresponding non-private optimal performances, and these results are obtained
through a unified and simple analysis;
(2) By modifying above framework slightly, we also extend our algorithm to BCO with multi-points
2Note that adaptive adversary is ambiguous in bandits setting [6], so we only consider oblivious adversary throughout the
paper.
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feedback [3], and design the first LDP multi-points BCO algorithm with nearly optimal guarantees;
(3) For contextual bandits including contextual linear bandits and more difficult generalized linear ban-
dits, we propose corresponding algorithms with regret bounds O˜(T 3/4/ε) under (ε, δ)-LDP , which are con-
jectured to be optimal. Note these results show a fundamental difference between LDP and DP contextual
bandits as discussed above.
Note all our results can be extended in parallel to ε-LDP if using Laplacian noise instead of Gaussian
noise. Here, we only focus on (ε, δ)-LDP.
Comparison with Prior Work: As mentioned earlier, for context-free bandits, nearly all of previous
work focused on differentially private bandits learning, rather than stronger LDP guarantee. Only algorithms
proposed in Tossou and Dimitrakakis [37] and Agarwal and Singh [5] for adversarial MAB can be converted
to LDP version easily and obtain almost the same results. Though both their algorithms and ours are nearly
the same in MAB, which is a very special case of bandits learning, our analysis is different, and we prove
a new result for MAB with LDP guarantee as a side-product, which achieves nearly optimal regret bound
under both adversarial and stochastic environment simultaneously (Appendix B.1). What’s more, our results
apply to more general bandits learning. For more comparison with Agarwal and Singh [5], see Section 3.1.
Note, even in stronger LDP context-free bandits, our framework can achieve improved regret bounds for
smooth BCO compared with previous results under weaker DP guarantee [36]. Besides, to the best of our
knowledge, we give the first results for contextual bandits under LDP.
2 Preliminaries
Notations: [p] = {1, 2, · · · , p}. d is the dimension of decision space, and ei represents i-th basis vector.
For a vector x and a matrix M , define ‖x‖M :=
√
x⊤Mx. Given a set W , we define the projection into this
set as ΠW (·).
Suppose the server collects certain information from each user with data domain C. C can be the range
of loss values in context-free bandits, or both contexts and losses/rewards in contextual bandits. Now we
define LDP rigorously:
Definition 1 (LDP). A mechanism Q : C → Z is said to protect (ǫ, δ)-LDP, if for any two data x, x′ ∈ C,
and any (measurable) subset U ⊂ Z, there is
Pr[Q(x) ∈ U ] 6 eǫ Pr[Q(x′) ∈ U ] + δ
In particular, if Q preserves (ε, 0)-LDP, we call it ε-LDP.
Now, we introduce a basic mechanism in LDP literature - Gaussian Mechanism. Given any function
h : C → Rd. Define ∆ := maxx,x′∈C ‖h(x)− h(x′)‖2, then Gaussian Mechanism is defined as h(x)+Y , where
random vector Y is sampled from Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2Id) with σ = ∆
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ε . One can prove
Gaussian Mechanism preserves (ε, δ)-LDP [12].
Next, we define the common strong convexity and smoothness for a function f .
Definition 2. We say that a function f : X → R is µ-strongly convex if there is: f(x)−f(y) 6 ∇f(x)⊤(x−
y) − µ2 ‖x− y‖22. We say that a function f : X → R is β-smooth if it satisfies the following inequality:∣∣f(x)− f(y)−∇f(y)⊤(x− y)∣∣ 6 β2 ‖x− y‖22
3 Nearly Optimal Context-Free Bandits Learning with LDP Guar-
antee
In this section, we consider private context-free bandits learning with LDP guarantee, including bandits
with one-point or multi-points feedback. As the following theorem shows, LDP is much stronger than DP
in this setting (see Appendix A for the definition of DP in streaming setting and the proof), therefore it is
more difficult to design algorithms under LDP with nearly optimal guarantee.
Theorem 1. If an algorithm A protects ε-LDP, then any algorithm based on the output of A on a sequence
of users guarantees ε-DP in streaming setting.
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Algorithm 1: One-Point Bandits Learning-LDP
1 Input: non-private algorithm A, privacy parameters ε, δ
2 Initialize: set σ =
2B
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ε
3 for t = 1, 2, . . . do
4 Server plays xt ∈ X returned by A;
5 User t suffers loss ft(xt) and sends ft(xt) + Zt to A in the server, where Zt ∼ N (0, σ2);
6 A receives ft(xt) + Zt and calculates xt+1
3.1 Private Bandits Learning with one-point feedback
Bandits learning with one-point feedback includes several important cases, such as BCO, MAB, and Best
Arm Identification (BAI). Generally speaking, we need to choose an action in the decision set at each round
based on all previous information, then receive corresponding loss value of the action we choose. Most of
time, our goal is to design an algorithm to minimize regret (it will be defined clearly later) compared with
any fixed competitor.
Different with previous work [36, 30, 38, 37, 32], which designed delicate algorithms for different bandit
learning problems under DP, here we propose a general framework to solve all of them within a unified
analysis under stronger LDP. Our general private framework is shown in Algorithm 1, based on a pre-chosen
non-private black-box bandits learning algorithm A. Definitions of X , ft and the choice of A in Algorithm 1
will be made clear in concrete settings below. Here we only assume all ft(x) are bounded by a constant B,
i.e. ∀x ∈ X , t ∈ [T ], |ft(x)| 6 B.
For private linear bandits learning, Agarwal and Singh [5] also proposes a general reduction framework
that can achieve nearly optimal regret. The key idea is to inject a linear perturbation 〈nt, xt〉 to the observed
value ft(xt) at each round, where xt is the current decision strategy and nt is fresh noise vector sampled
from a predefined distribution. Because of the special form of linear loss, their approach actually protects
data sequence in the functional sense, i.e. it is equivalent to disturbing original linear loss function ft(x)
with noisy function n⊤t x. However, this approach cannot protect privacy when loss functions are nonlinear,
as injected noise depends on strategy xt. Just consider xt = 0, then it may leak the information of ft as
values of different nonlinear functions can be different at point xt = 0 and there is no noise at all if we use
perturbation 〈nt, xt〉. Instead, our main idea is to inject fresh noise variable directly to the observed loss
value at each round, which doesn’t rely on xt any more. Intuitively, this approaches looks more natural as
bandits learning algorithms only use the information of these observed loss values instead of loss functions.
Obviously, the LDP guarantee of Algorithm 1 is followed directly from basic Gaussian mechanism.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 guarantees (ε, δ)-LDP.
To show the power of Algorithm 1, here we consider its main application, Bandits Convex Optimization.
For another two concrete applications, MAB and BAI, see Appendix B for more details.
In bandit convex optimization [18], X is a bounded convex constraint set. At each round, the server
chooses a prediction xt based on previous collected information, then suffers and observers a loss value ft(xt).
The goal is to design an algorithm with low regret defined as maxx∈X E[
∑T
t=1 ft(xt)− ft(x)]. There are two
different environments which generate underlying loss function sequence {ft(x)|t ∈ [T ]}. For adversarial
BCO, there is no further assumption about {ft(x)|t ∈ [T ]} and they are fixed functions given before games
starts. For stochastic BCO [4], feedback ft(xt) is generated as f(xt) + qt, where f(x) is an unknown
convex function and {qt} are independently and identically distributed noise sampled from a sub-Gaussian
distribution Q with mean 0.
A critical ingredient in BCO is the gradient estimator constructed through the observed feedback. Be-
sides convexity, when ft have additional properties like smoothness or strong convexity, usually we need
to construct different gradient estimators and use different efficient non-private algorithms A to achieve
better performance [16, 3, 31, 20]. Denote ut as a uniform random vector sampled from the unit sphere,
then two representatives of gradient estimators are sphere sampling estimator dρft(xt)ut used in [16, 3] (ρ
is a parameter), and advanced ellipsoidal sampling estimator dft(xt)A
−1
t ut which is the key part in [31, 20]
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to further improve the performance, where At is the Hessian matrix induced by certain loss function with
self-concordant barrier.
When it comes to private setting, Thakurta and Smith [36] designed a delicate differentially private algo-
rithm with O˜ (T 3/4/ε) and O˜ (T 2/3/ε) guarantees for convex and strongly convex loss functions respectively,
based on classical sphere sampling estimator and tree-based aggregation technique [14]. To achieve better
bounds under additional smoothness assumption, it seems natural to combine their method with advanced
ellipsoidal sampling estimator. However, this approach doesn’t work even under DP guarantee, let alone
LDP guarantee. In detail, to protect privacy, usually we need to add noise proportional to the range of infor-
mation we use. For classical sphere sampling estimator, it is bounded by dB/ρ. However, for the advanced
ellipsoidal sampling estimator, the spectral norm of inverse Hessian of self-concordant barrier (i.e. A−1t ) can
be unbounded, which makes it hard to protect privacy. Besides, tree-based aggregation techniques fail in
LDP setting.
Instead of adding noise to the accumulated estimated gradient like Thakurta and Smith [36], our general
reduction Algorithm 1 injects noise directly to the loss value that is already bounded. Based on the critical
observation that the regret defined for original loss functions {ft(x)|t ∈ [T ]} equals to the regret defined
for virtual loss functions {ft(x) + Zt|t ∈ [T ]} in expectation, we avoid complex analysis which is based on
a connection with non-private solutions [36], and obtain the utility of our private algorithm through the
guarantee of non-private algorithm A directly as the following shows:
Theorem 3. Suppose non-private algorithm A achieves regret B · RegTA for BCO, where B is the range of
loss function. We have the following guarantee for Algorithm 1: for any x ∈ X , there is
E
[
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− ft(x)
]
6 O˜
(
B ln(T/δ)
ε
·RegTA
)
(1)
where expectation is taken over the randomness of non-private algorithm A and all injected noise. 3
With above theorem, by plugging different non-private optimal algorithms under variant cases, we obtain
corresponding regret bounds with LDP guarantee:
Corollary 4. When loss functions are convex and β-smooth, Algorithm 1 achieves O˜(T 2/3/ε) regret by
setting A as Algorithm 1 in [31]. When loss functions are µ-strongly convex and β-smooth, Algorithm 1
achieves O˜(√T/ε) regret by setting A as Algorithm 1 in [20]. For private Stochastic BCO, using Algorithm
2 in [4] as the black-box algorithm will achieve O˜(√T/ε) regret.
Note this result improves previous result [36] in three aspects. First, our Algorithm 1 guarantees stronger
LDP rather than DP. Second, it achieves better regret bounds when loss functions are further smooth, and
matches corresponding non-private results. Third, our algorithm is easy to be implemented, admits a unified
analysis, and also obtains new results in stochastic BCO.
3.2 Private Bandits Convex Optimization with Multi-Point Feedback
Now we consider BCO with Multi-Point Feedback. Different with one-point bandit feedback setting,
where we can only query one point at each round, now we can query multiple points. This is natural in many
applications, such as in personalized recommendation, we can recommend multiple items to each user and
receive their feedback. Suppose we are permitted to query K points per round (denote them as xt,1, . . . , xt,K
at round t), then we observe ft(xt,1), . . . , ft(xt,K). Suppose decision set X satisfies rB ⊂ X ⊂ RB like in
Agarwal, Dekel, and Xiao [3], where B is the unit ball in Rd. The expected regret is defined as
E
[
1
K
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
ft(xt,k)
]
−min
x∈X
E
[
T∑
t=1
ft(x)
]
(2)
where {ft(x)} are G-Lipschitz convex functions, and expectation is taken over the randomness of algorithm.
3Actually, if using the high probability guarantee of black-box algorithm A, we can also obtain corresponding high probability
guarantee of our Algorithm 1. See Appendix E for more details, and the same argument there can be extended to results in
section 3.2 as well.
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Algorithm 2: Two-Point Feedback Private Bandit Convex Optimization via Black-box Reduction
1 Input: set A as Algorithm 4 (in Appendix C) with parameters η, ρ, ξ, privacy parameters ε, δ
2 Initialize: set σ =
2G
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ε , η =
1√
T
, ρ = log TT , ξ =
ρ
r
3 for t = 1, 2, . . . do
4 Server plays xt,1, xt,2 ∈ X received from A
5 User suffers ft(xt,1), ft(xt,2) and passes ft(xt,1)− ft(xt,2) + n⊤t (xt,1 − xt,2) to A in the server,
where nt ∼ N (0, σ2Id)
With the relaxation of amount about queries, there is a significant difference about regret bound of
BCO between one-point feedback and K-point feedback for K > 2 [3]. In detail, the minimax regret for
general BCO with one-point feedback is in order O˜(√T ) (even for strongly convex and smooth losses [33]),
whereas one can design algorithms for BCO under multi-point feedback with O(√T ) regret for convex loss
and O(log T ) regret for strongly convex loss, just like full information online convex optimization. As there is
not much difference between K = 2 and K > 2, so we focus on K = 2 in this paper. An optimal non-private
algorithm can be found in [3] and is given as Algorithm 4 in Appendix C for completion, which will be used
as our black-box algorithm later.
For private version of this problem, note our previous reduction framework no longer fits in this new
setting, mainly because of multiple feedback. If we add the same noise Zt to observed values ft(xt,1), ft(xt,2),
then it cannot guarantee privacy. If we use different noise Zt,1, Zt,2 to perturb observed values respectively,
though it protects privacy, previous utility analysis fails.
Based on the non-private algorithm, we design a slightly modified reduction framework that resembles the
approach in Agarwal and Singh [5] but for Multi-Point BCO, as shown in Algorithm 2. The key observation
is that now we play two pretty close points xt,1, xt,2 at each round, and critical information we use about
user t is only the difference ft(xt,1)− ft(xt,2) of two observed values. Note xt,1− xt,2 = 2ρut (see Algorithm
4 in Appendix C), which implies we can add noise n⊤t (xt,1 − xt,2) to ft(xt,1)− ft(xt,2) to protect its privacy.
As ft(x) is G-Lipschitz, hence |ft(xt,1) − ft(xt,2)| 6 2ρG ‖ut‖2 and adding Gaussian noise with standard
deviation σ =
2G
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)
ε is enough to protect privacy as ‖ut‖2 = 1.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 2 guarantees (ε, δ)-LDP.
For utility analysis of Algorithm 2, as now the noise depends on strategies xt,1, xt,2 at round t, hence
both output and regret in terms of original loss functions {ft(x)|t ∈ [T ]} are the same as output and regret
in terms of virtual loss functions {ft(x) + n⊤t x|t ∈ [T ]} in expectation. Therefore we can obtain the utility
of our private Algorithm 2 through the guarantee of non-private algorithm A:
Theorem 6. For any x ∈ X , Algorithm 2 guarantees
E
[
1
2
T∑
t=1
(ft(xt,1) + ft(xt,2))− ft(x)
]
6 O˜
(
d3
√
T
ε2
)
(3)
If {ft} are further µ strongly convex, set η = 1µt , ρ = log TT , ξ = ρr , then for any x ∈ X , we have
E
[
1
2
T∑
t=1
(ft(xt,1) + ft(xt,2))− ft(x)
]
6 O˜
(
d3 logT
µε2
)
(4)
From above results, one can see there is also a significant difference about regret bounds between BCO
and Multi-Point BCO under LDP setting, which is exactly the same as non-private settings.
4 Contextual Bandits Learning with LDP Guarantee
In this section, we turn our attention to more practical contextual bandits learning. At each round t, the
learner needs to choose an action xt ∈ Xt in the local side, where Xt contains the personal information and
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features about underlying arms. Then the user generates a reward which is assumed to be yt = g(x
⊤
t θ
∗)+ηt,
where θ∗ is an unknown true parameter in the domainW , g : R→ R is a known function, and ηt is a random
noise in [−1, 1] with mean 0 4. If we know θ∗, xt,∗ := argmaxx∈Xt g(x⊤θ∗) is apparently the optimal choice
at round t. For an algorithm A, we define its regret over T rounds as RegAT :=
∑T
t=1 g(x
⊤
t,∗θ
∗) − g(x⊤t θ∗),
where {xt, t ∈ [T ]} is the output of A. We omit the superscript A when it is clear. There are two critical
parts in contextual bandits. One is to estimate θ∗, and corresponding estimated parameter is used to find
best action for exploitation. Another one is to construct certain term for the purpose of exploration, since
we are in the environment of partial feedback. Throughout this section, we assume both {Xt} and W are
bounded by a d-dimensional L2 ball with radius 1 for simplicity.
Compared with private context-free bandits, private contextual bandits learning is more difficult, not only
because of relatively complicated setting, but we need to protect more information including both contexts
and rewards, which causes additional difficulty in the analysis of regret. As a warm-up, we show how to
design algorithm with LDP guarantee for contextual linear bandits, which resembles a recent work [34] but
under a relaxed version of DP. Next, we propose a more complicated algorithm for generalized linear bandits
with LDP guarantee.
4.1 Warm-Up: LDP Contextual Linear Bandits
In contextual linear bandits, mapping g is an identity, or equivalently, the reward generated by user t for
action xt is yt = x
⊤
t θ
∗ + ηt. To estimate θ∗, the straightforward method is to use linear regression based on
collected data. Combined with classic principal for exploration, optimism in the face of uncertainty, it leads
to LinUCB [2], which is nearly optimal for contextual linear bandits. To protect privacy, it’s not surprising
that we adopt the same technique as LDP linear regression [35], i.e. injecting noise to xtx
⊤
t and ytxt collected
from user t. However, the injected noise have influence not only over the parameter estimation, but also for
further exploration part, due to more complex bandit model, thus we need to set parameters more carefully.
See Algorithm 5 in Appendix D.
Now, we state the theoretical guarantee of Algorithm 5.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 5 guarantees (ǫ, δ)-LDP.
Theorem 8. With probability at least 1− α, the regret of Algorithm 5 satisfies the following bound:
RegT 6 O˜
(√
log
1
δ
log
1
α
(dT )3/4
ǫ
)
(5)
Given the Ω(T ) lower bound for DP contextual linear bandits [34], Theorem 8 implies a fundamental
difference between LDP and DP in contextual bandit learning, which also verifies that LDP is a more
appropriate standard about privacy for contextual bandits as discussed in the introduction.
4.2 LDP Generalized Linear Bandits
In generalized linear bandits, mapping g can be regarded as the inverse link function of exponential family
model. Here we suppose function g is G-Lipschitz, continuously differentiable on [−1, 1], |g(a)| 6 C, and
infa∈(−1,1) g′(a) = µ > 0, which implies g is strictly increasing. These assumptions are common either in
real applications or previous work [28, 24]. We also define corresponding negative log-likelihood function
ℓ(a, b) := −ab + m(a), where m(·) is the integral of function g. As a concrete example, if reward y is a
Bernoulli random variable, then the form of g is g(a) = (1 + exp(−a))−1, m(a) = log(1 + exp(a)), ℓ(a, b) =
log(1 + exp(−a(2b− 1))), b ∈ {0, 1}, and noise η is 1− g(a) with probability g(a) and −g(a) otherwise.
Note the non-linearity of g makes things much more complicated either from the view of bandits learning
or privacy preservation. The counterpart of Contextual Linear Bandits is linear regression, the locally private
version of which is relatively easy and well-studied. However, the counterpart of Generalized Linear Bandit
is Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) with respect to generalized linear loss, and the optimal approach of
parameter estimation for GLM bandit is to solve ERM at each round [28]. Different with linear regression, for
4It’s not hard to relax this constraint to a sub-Gaussian noise.
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Algorithm 3: Generalized Linear Bandits with LDP
1 Input: privacy parameters ε, δ, failure probability α
2 Initialize: V˜0 = 0d×d, u˜0 = 0d, θ˜0 = θˆ1 = 0d, ζ = Θ(1/
√
T ), σ = 6
√
2 ln(3.75/δ)/ǫ
3 Notations: Υt = σ
√
t(4
√
d+ 2 ln(2T/α)), ct = 2Υt, β
2
t = O˜(Cσµ
√
dt)
4 for t = 1, 2, . . . do
5 For the local user t:
6 Receive information V˜t−1, θ˜t−1, θˆt from the server
7 Play action xt = argmaxx∈Dt
〈
θ˜t−1, x
〉
+ βt−1 ‖x‖V˜ −1
t−1
8 Observe reward yt = g(x
⊤
t θ
∗) + ηt, set zt = x⊤t θˆt.
9 Send xtx
⊤
t +Bt, ztxt + ξt,∇ℓt(θˆt) + rt to the server, where
ℓt(θ) = ℓ(x
⊤
t θ, yt), Bt(i, j)
i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2), ∀i 6 j, and
B(j, i) = B(i, j), ξt ∼ N (0d, σ2Id×d), rt ∼ N (0d, C2σ2Id×d)
10 For the server:
11 Update V¯t = V¯t−1 + xtx⊤t +Bt, u˜t = u˜t−1 + ztxt + ξt θ˜t = V˜
−1
t u˜t, where V˜t = V¯t + ctId×d
θˆt+1 = ΠW
(
θˆt − ζ(∇ℓt(θˆt) + rt)
)
learning ERM with LDP guarantee, in general there is no efficient private algorithm that can achieve optimal
performance in the non-interactive environment [35, 41, 40], let alone calculating an accurate parameter
estimation needed in our problem. Therefore, it seems hard to learn generalized linear bandit under LDP
guarantee.
Luckily, we can make full use of the interactive environment in bandit problems. In detail, we build our
private mechanism based on GLOC framework proposed in [24]. Compared with previous nearly optimal
approach [28], GLOC framework enjoys much better time efficiency, which calculates estimator θ in an online
fashion instead of solving ERM at each round. Its main idea is to maintain a rough estimation for unknown
parameter θ∗ through an adversarial online learning algorithm and use it to relabel current reward, and
then solve the corresponding linear regression for a refined estimator. To achieve optimal O˜(√T ) regret, the
online learning algorithm is set as Online Newton Step [19].
Though the original goal of GLOC framework proposed in Jun et al. [24] is to improve time efficiency, the
update form of estimated parameter for unknown θ∗ shares the same form of linear regression, therefore we
can use nearly the same technique as in previous subsection to protect LDP, which avoids solving complex
ERM with LDP guarantee. Besides, since internal online learning algorithm also utilizes users’ data, we
also need to guarantee its privacy. Different with Jun et al. [24] which adopts Online Newton Step, we
choose basic noisy Online Gradient Descent as our online black-box algorithm. See Algorithm 3 for the full
implementation. For clarity, we just write the LDP Online Gradient Descent explicitly in Line 11.
Though Algorithm 3 is based on the framework proposed by Jun et al. [24], we want to emphasize that
both finding the right approach and proving the rigorous guarantee are non-trivial because of stringent LDP
constraint. Following theorems give both the privacy guarantee and utility bound of our Algorithm 3 for
generalized linear bandits.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 3 guarantees (ǫ, δ)-LDP.
Theorem 10. With probability at least 1− α, the regret of Algorithm 3 satisfies the following bound:
RegT 6 O˜
(√
log
1
δ
log
1
α
log
T
d
(dT )3/4
ǫ
)
(6)
Note that both our upper bounds (5) and (6) are in order O˜ (T 3/4), which differ from common O(√T ) re-
gret bound in corresponding non-private settings. We conjecture this order is nearly the best one can achieve
in LDP setting, mainly because we need to protect more information, i.e., both contexts and corresponding
rewards. See Appendix G for more discussions and intuitions.
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Appendix
A Differential Privacy under streaming setting
Differential Privacy [13] is original proposed for off-line setting. Later, Dwork et al. [14] and Jain, Kothari,
and Thakurta [21] consider DP in streaming setting. In streaming setting, at each round t, the server predicts
xt ∈ X for user t whose personal data is represented as ht ∈ H (for example, his or her feature, label, or
preference etc.). Then the server requires some information zt ∈ Z from user t (zt may depend on xt and ht)
to update the model for next prediction. Note DP allows collecting true data (i.e. zt = ht) and is defined in
terms of the output sequence {xt}, while LDP doesn’t allow collecting true data and is defined in terms of
the collected information zt. Here we adopt the definition given in Jain, Kothari, and Thakurta [21] for DP
in streaming setting:
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy). Let F = 〈h1, h2, . . . , hT 〉 be a sequence of information which domain is
H1:T . Let A(F ) = Y , where Y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yT 〉 ∈ Y1:T be T outputs of the randomized algorithm A. A is
said to preserve (ε, δ)-differential privacy, if for any two information sequences F, F ′ that differ in at most
one entry, and for any subset S1:T ⊂ Y1:T , it holds that
Pr(A(F ) ∈ S1:T ) ≤ Pr(A(F ′) ∈ S1:T )eε + δ.
In particular, if A preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy, we say A is ε-differentially private.
Now, we prove Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose algorithm A : H → Z protects ε-LDP, that is for any h, h′ ∈ H, U ⊂ Z, we
have
Pr(A(h) ∈ U) 6 eε × Pr(A(h′) ∈ U)
Denote G as arbitrary online/bandits algorithm received the output of A on user sequence, i.e. {zt =
A(ht|xt)|t ∈ [T ]}. Now we prove G protects ε-DP, i.e. for any S1:T ⊂ X 1:T and neighboring sequence
F = {ht|t ∈ [T ]}, F ′ = {h′t|t ∈ [T ]} that only differ in one entry, we have the following inequality:
Pr(G(A(F )) ∈ S1:T ) 6 eε × Pr(G(A(F ′)) ∈ S1:T )
Without loss of generality, we assume F and F ′ differ in the t-th entry. Since G only operates on {zt|t ∈ [T ]},
according to the Post-Processing property of DP [12], we only need to prove {zt|t ∈ [T ]} satisfies ε-DP. Denote
{z′t|t ∈ [T ]} as the neighboring information sequence of A operated on F ′, then for arbitrary U1:T ⊂ Z1:T
we have
Pr(z1:T ∈ U1:T )
Pr(z′1:T ∈ U1:T )
(7)
=
Pr(z1:t−1 ∈ U1:t−1)× Pr(zt ∈ U t|z1:t−1 ∈ U1:t−1)× Pr(zt+1:T ∈ U t+1:T |z1:t ∈ U1:t)
Pr(z′1:t−1 ∈ U1:t−1)× Pr(z′t ∈ U t|z′1:t−1 ∈ U1:t−1)× Pr(z′t+1:T ∈ U t+1:T |z′1:t ∈ U1:t)
(8)
=
Pr(zt ∈ U t|z1:t−1 ∈ U1:t−1)
Pr(z′t ∈ U t|z′1:t−1 ∈ U1:t−1)
(9)
=
Pr(zt ∈ U t|xt ∈ G(U1:t−1))
Pr(z′t ∈ U t|x′t ∈ G(U1:t−1))
(10)
6eε (11)
where the second equation is because two data sequence only differ at round t, and G operates on the sequence
of z. Thus we prove the theorem.
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B Another Two Applications for Bandits Learning with One-point Feedback
B.1 Private Multi-Armed Bandits
MAB is a special case of BCO, in which decision set X = {ei|i ∈ [d]}, and loss function ft(x) is actually
a linear function, i.e. ft(x) = ℓ
⊤
t x, where ℓt ∈ [0, 1]d . In the adversarial setting, sequence {ℓt} is chosen
arbitrarily before game starts. In stochastic setting, for each arm k, {ℓt(k)} are independently sampled from
underlying unknown distribution Vk with support over interval [0, 1]. Denote µk as the expected loss of arm
k. Without loss of generality, assume µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µd and define ∆i := µi − µd. It is well-known the
optimal regret are O(√dT ) and O(∑i:∆i>0 log T∆i ) for adversarial MAB and stochastic MAB respectively [9].
However, especially in real applications, usually we don’t know whether we are in adversarial or stochastic
environment in advance. Until recently, Zimmert and Seldin [42] proposed a single algorithm achieving
the optimal performance for both adversarial and stochastic world without any prior information about the
environment.
For differentially private MAB, all of previous work consider either stochastic loss or adversarial loss [30,
38, 37, 5]. While here, we hope to handle both scenarios simultaneously like in non-private case but with
LDP guarantee. Not surprisingly, by plugging the non-private optimal algorithm [42] in our black-box, we
obtain corresponding private version which achieves the best of both adversarial and stochastic worlds:
Theorem 11. By choosing non-private black-box algorithm A in Algorithm 1 as Tsallis-Inf in Zimmert
and Seldin [42] and setting σ as in Theorem 2 with B = 0.5,
• in the adversarial setting, we have
max
x∈X
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x)
]
6 O˜
(√
T
ε
)
(12)
• in the stochastic setting, we have
max
x∈X
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(xt)− ℓt(x)
]
6 O˜
( ∑
i:∆i>0
logT
∆iε2
log
1
δ
)
(13)
Note above results not only nearly match corresponding non-private lower bounds [9] regardless of privacy
parameters, but also lower bounds under LDP restriction [7]. Besides, we can also use many other MAB
algorithms as our black-box candidates such as KL-UCB [17] Stochastic MAB, which will then obtain more
delicate bound under LDP.
B.2 Private Best Arm Identification
Different with Stochastic MAB, in which one has to balance between Exploration and Exploitation, Best
Arm Identification (BAI) problem only focuses on the Exploration, that is finding the best arm among all
arms. Here we use same notations as Subsection B.1. There are mainly two settings in BAI: fixed confidence
setting and fixed budget setting. In this part, we only consider fixed confidence setting: given any confidence
parameter γ, design an algorithm which outputs the best arm with probability at least 1− γ using as fewest
samples as possible [22, 26]. It’s not hard to see our method can be generalized to fixed budget setting as
well.
For private BAI, though algorithms in Mishra and Thakurta [30] and Sajed and Sheffet [32] are designed
for stochastic MAB, they can also used for differentially private BAI. However, these algorithms only achieve
sub-optimal guarantee, let alone stronger LDP. While here, we want to protect LDP and achieve nearly
optimal sample complexity. Again, using the same observation as Subsection B.1 and given any non-private
BAI algorithm A, our Algorithm 1 has the following guarantee:
Theorem 12. Given any confidence parameter γ, suppose non-private BAI algorithm A achieves sample
complexity SA(A, σ20 , γ), where σ20 is the variance proxy parameter of underlying unknown sub-Gaussian
distributions {Vk|k ∈ [d]}. Set σ as in Theorem 2 with B = 0.5, then the sample complexity of Private BAI
Algorithm 1 is SA(A, 14 + σ2, γ).
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Algorithm 4: Expected Gradient Descent with two queries per round [3]
1 Input: Learning rate η, exploration parameter ρ and shrinkage coefficient ξ
2 Set y1 = 0
3 for t = 1, 2, . . . do
4 Pick a unit vector ut uniformly at random
5 Play xt,1 := yt + ρut, xt,2 := yt − ρut, and observe ft(xt,1), ft(xt,2)
6 Set g˜t =
d
2ρ (ft(xt,1)− ft(xt,2)) ut
7 update yt+1 =
∏
(1−ξ)X (yt − ηg˜t), where
∏
X represents projection to the set X
Algorithm 5: Contextual Linear Bandits with LDP
1 Input: privacy parameters ε, δ, failure probability α Initialize: V˜0 = 0d×d, u˜0 = 0d, θ˜0 = 0d,
2 σ = 6
√
2 ln(2.5/δ)/ǫ Notations: Υt = σ
√
t(4
√
d+ 2 ln(2T/α)), ct = 2Υt,
3 βt = 2σ
√
d lnT +
(√
3Υt + σ
√
dt
Υt
)
d lnT
4 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
5 For the local user t:
6 Receive information V˜t−1, θ˜t−1 from the server.
7 Play action xt = argmaxx∈Dt
〈
θ˜t−1, x
〉
+ βt ‖x‖(V˜t−1+ct−1I)−1
8 Observe reward yt = 〈xt, θ∗〉+ ηt
9 Send xtx
⊤
t +Bt, ytxt + ξt to the server, where Bt(i, j)
i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2), ∀i 6 j, and
B(j, i) = B(i, j), ξt ∼ N (0d, σ2Id×d).
10 For the server: update
11 V˜t = V˜t−1 + xtx⊤t +Bt, u˜t = u˜t−1 + ytxt + ξt
12 θ˜t =
(
V˜t + ctId×d
)−1
u˜t
Specifically, if we choose non-private BAI algorithm A as lil’UCB in Jamieson et al. [23], then the sample
complexity of Algorithm 1 is in order O
(∑
k 6=1
ln((ln 1/∆2k)/γ)
ε2∆2
k
ln 1δ
)
.
C Non-private Algorithm for Bandits Learning with Two-points Feedback
For completeness, we present the non-private algorithm proposed in Agarwal, Dekel, and Xiao [3] for
Bandits Convex Optimization with two-point feedback.
D Contextual Linear Bandits with LDP
See Algorithm 5 above.
E Omitted Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2. Since for any x ∈ X , t ∈ [T ], |ft(x)| 6 B, which means the sensitivity of information
sent from the user is at most 2B, thus (ε, δ)-LDP property of Algorithm 1 follows directly from the Gaussian
mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 3. Note all noise are independently sampled, hence we can fix Z1, . . . ZT in advance. Define
pseudo loss f˜t(x) = ft(x) + Zt. According to the tail bound of Gaussian variable, there is
Pr
[
|Zt| > σ
√
2 ln 2T 2
]
6
1
T 2
(14)
14
By union bound, we have
Pr
[
∃t ∈ [T ], |Zt| > σ
√
2 ln 2T 2
]
6
1
T
(15)
Define the event F := {∃t ∈ [T ] : |Zt| > σ
√
2 ln 2T 2}, then there is Pr[F ] 6 1T .
Once fixed Z1, . . . , ZT , the output of running Algorithm 1 over loss sequence {ft|t ∈ [T ]} is the same as
the output of running non-private algorithm A over pseudo loss sequence {f˜t|t ∈ [T ]}.
On one hand, we have
E
[
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt)− f˜t(x)
]
6E
[
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt)− f˜t(x)|F¯
]
+ Pr[F ]× E
[
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt)− f˜t(x)|F
]
(16)
6E
[
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt)− f˜t(x)|F¯
]
+ 2B (17)
6(B + σ
√
2 ln(2T 2)) · RegTA + 2B (18)
On the other hand, according to our definition of f˜t(x), there is always
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt)− f˜t(x) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− ft(x) (19)
Combine above equations, we obtain the conclusion.
For the high probability version, suppose black-box algorithm A guarantees that: for any loss sequence
{f˜t(x)} with loss range B˜, with probability at least 1− κ (over the internal randomness of A), there is
∀x ∈ X ,
∑
t
f˜t(xt)−
∑
t
f˜t(x) 6 B˜ ·RegTA (20)
According to union bound and above discussion, we know: B˜ = B + σ
√
2 ln(2T 2), and with probability at
least 1− κ− 1T , there is
∀x ∈ X ,
∑
t
ft(xt)−
∑
t
ft(x) 6 O˜
(
B ln(T/δ)
ε
· RegTA
)
(21)
Proof of Corollary 4. The guarantee for (strongly) convex and smooth bandit optimization is straightforward
by plugging corresponding non-private guarantees in Saha and Tewari [31] and Hazan and Levy [20]. For
Stochastic BCO, since our algorithm is equivalent to the case of running any stochastic BCO algorithm over
new noise distribution Q⊗N (0, σ2), where⊗ represents the convolution between two distributions, we can
use the guarantee for stochastic BCO in Agarwal et al. [4].
Proof of Theorem 11. In adversarial setting, using Theorem 3 obtains the regret bound. Now we prove the
regret bound in stochastic setting. Note for any k ∈ [d], as the support of original distribution Vk is over [0, 1],
it is a sub-Gaussian distribution with variance proxy 14 . Define pseudo distribution V˜k = Vk
⊗N (0, σ2),
where
⊗
represents the convolution between two distributions. Obviously, the output of Algorithm 1 over
distributions {Vk|k ∈ [K]} is the same as the output of non-private algorithm A over distributions {V˜k|k ∈
[K]}. As V˜k is now a sub-Gaussian with variance proxy 14 + σ2, hence it’s not hard to obtain the conclusion
according to the guarantee of A.
Proof of Theorem 12. Just use Theorem 2 in the paper Jamieson and Nowak [22] with new sub-Gaussian
parameter 14 + σ
2
Proof of Theorem 5. Since |ft(xt,1)−ft(xt,2)| 6 2ρG ‖ut‖2 = 2ρG and n⊤t (xt,1−xt,2) = 2ρn⊤t ut which obeys
N (0, 4ρ2σ2), the privacy guarantee then follows according to Gaussian mechanism.
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Proof of Theorem 6. Note all noise vectors are independently sampled, hence we can fix n1, . . . , nT in ad-
vance. Define pseudo loss f˜t(x) = ft(x) +n
⊤
t x. For any {ut|t ∈ [T ]} in the unit sphere, according to the tail
bound of Gaussian variable, there is
Pr
[
|n⊤t ut| > σ
√
2 ln 2T 2
]
6
1
T 2
(22)
By union bound, we have
Pr
[
∃t ∈ [T ], |n⊤t ut| > σ
√
2 ln 2T 2
]
6
1
T
(23)
Define the event F := {∃t ∈ [T ] : |n⊤t ut| > σ
√
2 ln 2T 2}, then there is Pr[F ] 6 1T .
Once fixed n1, . . . , nT , the output of running Algorithm 2 over loss sequence {ft|t ∈ [T ]} is the same as
the output of running non-private Algorithm 4 over pseudo loss sequence {f˜t|t ∈ [T ]}.
On one hand, we have
E
[
1
2
T∑
t=1
(
f˜t(xt,1) + f˜t(xt,2)
)
− f˜t(x)
]
(24)
6E
[
1
2
T∑
t=1
(
f˜t(xt,1) + f˜t(xt,2)
)
− f˜t(x)|F¯
]
+ Pr[F ]× E
[
1
2
T∑
t=1
(
f˜t(xt,1) + f˜t(xt,2)
)
− f˜t(x)|F
]
(25)
6E
[
1
2
T∑
t=1
(
f˜t(xt,1) + f˜t(xt,2)
)
− f˜t(x)|F¯
]
+ 2B (26)
6Reg(A, G+ σ
√
d) + 2B (27)
where Reg(A, G + σ√d) represents the regret bound of non-private Algorithm 4 for loss functions with
Lipschitz constant G+ σ
√
d. On the other hand, there is
E
[
T∑
t=1
f˜t(xt)− f˜t(x)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− ft(x)
]
(28)
Combine above equations with the guarantee of non-private Algorithm 4 in Agarwal, Dekel, and Xiao [3],
we obtain the conclusion.
F Omitted Proofs in Section 4
Proof of Theorem 7. Since ‖xt‖ 6 1, yt ∈ [−2, 2] according to our assumption, the privacy guarantee then
follows directly from the Gaussian Mechanism, as both the matrix and vector sent to the server satisfy
(ǫ/3, δ/2)-LDP and (2ǫ/3, δ/2)-LDP respectively.
Proof of Theorem 8. Note our private matrix V˜t is an unbiased estimation of true matrix
∑t
s=1 xsx
⊤
s with
noise Ht :=
∑t
s=1Bs, where its upper triangular entry obeys the distribution N (0, tσ2). Similarly, u˜t is an
unbiased estimation of true vector
∑t
s=1 ysxs with noise ht :=
∑t
s=1 ξs, where ht ∼ N (0d, tσ2Id×d). Accord-
ing to the concentration inequality [39], we know ‖Ht‖2 6 σ
√
t(4
√
d + 2 ln(2T/α)) = Υt with probability
at least 1 − α/2T , thus all the eigenvalues of Ht + ctId×d are in the range [Υt, 3Υt] with high probability.
Besides, we have ‖ht‖(Ht+ctId×d)−1 6
√
Υ−1t ‖ht‖2, and ‖ht‖2 6 σ
√
dt with high probability. Now, using
Proposition 4, Proposition 11 and Theorem 5 in paper [34] with our noise, we obtain the conclusion.
Proof of Theorem 9. Since ‖xt‖ 6 1, |zt| 6 1, and loss function ℓt is C-Lipschitz, the privacy guarantee
follows directly from the Gaussian Mechanism, as the matrix, vector, and gradient of any user sent to the
server satisfy (ǫ/3, δ/3)-LDP respectively.
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Proof of Theorem 10. Define instantaneous regret rt : g(x
⊤
t,∗θ
∗)−g(x⊤t θ∗), then there is rt 6 G(x⊤t,∗θ∗−x⊤t θ∗).
Besides
x⊤t θ
∗ + 2βt−1 ‖xt‖V˜ −1
t−1
> x⊤t θ
∗ +
∥∥∥θ˜t−1 − θ∗∥∥∥
V˜t−1
‖xt‖V˜ −1
t−1
+ βt−1 ‖xt‖V˜ −1
t−1
> x⊤t θ˜t−1 + βt−1 ‖xt‖V˜ −1
t−1
> x⊤t,∗θ˜t−1 + βt−1 ‖xt,∗‖V˜ −1
t−1
> x⊤t,∗θ
∗
where the second and the forth inequality is because of our Confidence Ellipsoid Lemma 2. Thus we have
rt 6 2Gβt−1 ‖xt‖V˜ −1
t−1
.
Next using common technique in contextual bandits to bound
∑
t ‖xt‖V˜ −1
t−1
[34, 24], we have
∑
t rt 6
GβT
√
dT logT , which finishes the proof.
Lemma 1 (Regret of LDP-OGD). For any convex loss sequence {ℓt(θ)|t ∈ [T ]} with Lipschitz constant C,
and for ∀θ ∈ Θ, with probability at least 1− α1, we have the following bound
T∑
t=1
ℓt(θˆt)− ℓt(θ) 6 O
(
Cσ
√
dT ln
T
α1
)
(29)
where {θˆt|t ∈ [T ]} are outputs of noisy OGD like step 13 in Algorithm 3, and the randomness is over noise
{rt|t ∈ [T ]}.
Proof. Condition on the event E = {∀t ∈ [T ], ‖rt‖2 6
√
dCσ} (which happens with high probability) and
according to the guarantee of On-line Gradient Descent [18], there is
∑
t ℓt(θˆt) + r
⊤
t θˆt − (ℓt(θ) + r⊤t θ) 6
O(Cσ√dT ). Next, using martingale concentration, we know
∥∥∥∑t r⊤t θˆt∥∥∥
2
6 σ
√
dT and
∥∥∑
t r
⊤
t θ
∥∥
2
6 Cσ
√
dT
with high probability. Combining above three inequalities, we obtain the conclusion.
Lemma 2 (Confidence Ellipsoid). In terms of Algorithm 3, with probability at least 1 − α2, we have the
following bound
∀t,
∥∥∥θ˜t − θ∗∥∥∥2
V˜t
6 O˜
(
Cσ
µ
√
dT ln
T
α2
)
(30)
where {θ˜t, V˜t|t ∈ [T ]} are outputs of Algorithm 3, and the randomness is over the injected noise as well as
underlying environment.
Proof. Since infa∈(−1,1) g′(a) = µ > 0, it implies loss function ℓ(a, b) is µ-strongly convex in terms of the
first argument, thus
t∑
s=1
ℓs(θˆs)− ℓs(θ∗) =
t∑
s=1
ℓ(x⊤s θˆs, ys)− ℓ(x⊤s θ∗, ys) (31)
>
t∑
s=1
ℓ′(x⊤s θ
∗, ys)(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗) +
µ
2
(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗)2 (32)
=
t∑
s=1
(−ys + g(x⊤s θ∗))(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗) +
µ
2
(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗)2 (33)
=
t∑
s=1
−ηs(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗) +
µ
2
(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗)2 (34)
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Then according to Lemma 1 above, with probability at least 1− α1, there is
µ
2
t∑
s=1
(x⊤s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗)2 6 O
(
Cσ
√
dt ln
T
α1
)
+
t∑
s=1
ηs(x
⊤
s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗) (35)
Using Corollary 8 in paper [1], with probability at least 1 − α3 (over the randomness of noise {ηt}), for all
t, there is
t∑
s=1
ηs(x
⊤
s θˆs − x⊤s θ∗) 6
√√√√√
(
2 + 2
t∑
s=1
(x⊤s (θˆs − θ∗))2
)
· ln

 1
α3
√√√√1 + t∑
s=1
(x⊤s (θˆs − θ∗))2

 (36)
Combine above two inequalities, and solve the right hand side using Lemma 2 in paper [24], then with
probability 1− α1 − α3, we have
∀t,
t∑
s=1
(x⊤s (θˆs − θ∗))2 6 O˜
(
Cσ
µ
√
dt ln
T
α1
ln
T
α3
)
(37)
Denote Xt ∈ Rt×d as the design matrix consisting of x1, . . . , xt, Zt = [z1; z2; . . . ; zt] ∈ Rt, B¯t =∑t
s=1Bs, ξ¯t =
∑t
s=1 ξs. Note
t∑
s=1
(x⊤s (θˆs − θ∗))2 (38)
= ‖θ∗‖2X⊤
t
Xt
− 2Z⊤t Xtθ∗ + ‖Zt‖22 (39)
= ‖θ∗‖2V˜t − 2u˜⊤t θ∗ + ‖Zt‖
2
2 − ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+V˜0 + 2ξ¯⊤t θ∗ (40)
=
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
−
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
+ ‖Zt‖22 − ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+V˜0 + 2ξ¯⊤t θ∗ (41)
=
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
+
∥∥∥Xtθ˜t − Zt∥∥∥2
2
−
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
X⊤
t
Xt
+ 2θ˜⊤t X
⊤
t Zt −
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
− ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+V˜0 + 2ξ¯⊤t θ∗ (42)
=
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
+
∥∥∥Xtθ˜t − Zt∥∥∥2
2
−
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
X⊤
t
Xt
+ 2θ˜⊤t u˜t −
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
− ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+ctI + 2ξ¯⊤t (θ∗ − θ˜t) (43)
=
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
+
∥∥∥Xtθ˜t − Zt∥∥∥2
2
−
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
X⊤
t
Xt
+ 2
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
−
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
− ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+ctI + 2ξ¯⊤t (θ∗ − θ˜t) (44)
=
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
+
∥∥∥Xtθ˜t − Zt∥∥∥2
2
+
∥∥∥θ˜t∥∥∥2
B¯t+ctI
− ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+ctI + 2ξ¯⊤t (θ∗ − θ˜t) (45)
>
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
− ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+ctI − 2
∥∥ξ¯t∥∥2 − 2ξ¯⊤t θ˜t (46)
Combine above inequalities, there is
∥∥∥θ∗ − θ˜t∥∥∥2
V˜t
6 O˜
(
Cσ
µ
√
dt ln
T
α1
ln
T
α3
)
+ ‖θ∗‖2B¯t+ctI + 2
∥∥ξ¯t∥∥2 + 2ξ¯⊤t θ˜t (47)
On the other hand, with probability at least 1− α4, there is
‖θ∗‖2B¯t+ctI 6 O˜(Υt) = O˜(σ
√
dt) (48)∥∥ξ¯t∥∥2 6 O˜(σ√dt) (49)
and
ξ¯⊤t θ˜t 6 ξ¯
⊤
t V˜
−1
t (X
⊤
t Zt + ξ¯t) (50)
6 ξ¯⊤t V˜
−1
t X
⊤
t Zt + O˜(σ
√
dt) (51)
18
6 O˜(σ
√
dt) (52)
where the last inequality is because V˜ −1t X
⊤
t Zt is the solution of regularized least square loss function J(θ) :=
‖Xtθ − Zt‖22 + ‖θ‖2ctI+B¯t . Since J(θ∗) 6 O˜(σ
√
dt), and ΥtI 6 ctI + B¯t 6 3ΥtI holds with high probability,
there is
∥∥∥V˜ −1t X⊤t Zt∥∥∥ 6 O˜(1), otherwise it cannot be the solution of J(θ).
Thus, with probability at least 1− α1 − α3, we have
∥∥∥θ˜t − θ∗∥∥∥2
V˜t
6 O
(
Cσ
µ
√
dt ln
T
α1
ln
T
α3
)
(53)
Taking a union bound over all T rounds and choose appropriate α1, α3 we then finish the proof.
G Discussion about Lower Bound in LDP Contextual Bandits
Either for contextual linear bandits or more complex generalized linear bandits, both of our algorithms
with LDP guarantee can only achieve O˜(T 3/4) regret, contrasted with optimal O(T 1/2) regret in non-private
case [28], as well nearly optimal O˜(T 1/2) regret for MAB with LDP guarantee. The critical difference is
that we need to protect more information in contextual bandits. If we regard MAB as a special case of
contextual bandits, decision set Xt then becomes {ei|i ∈ [d]}. Privacy of contexts means we need to protect
(eIt , rt) sent from user t to the server at round t, where It is the chosen arm and rt is the reward of user t.
Recall in Section 3.1, we only protect rt. Denote θt as the estimation of underlying θ
∗ at round t, and define
Mt :=
∑t
τ=1 eIτ e
⊤
Iτ
. Roughly speaking, in almost all analysis of stochastic MAB, the regret bound depends
on O˜(√T ‖θT − θ∗‖MT ), and ‖θT − θ∗‖MT is nearly a constant in either non-private setting or our MAB
example in Appendix B.1. However in the setting of this section, on one hand, for those sub-optimal arms
i, the algorithm won’t play it too much, and its estimation error |θT (i)− θ∗(i)| is roughly in constant order.
On the other hand, since we still need to protect eIt at each round, which will lead to an estimation error
of MT in order
√
T . Therefore ‖θT − θ∗‖MT is roughly in order O˜(T 1/4) under LDP setting, which leads to
the final O˜(T 3/4) regret. Though this special case looks a little strange, it shows an inherent difficulty in
contextual bandits learning with LDP guarantee, and we conjecture that Ω(T 3/4) is exactly the lower bound
in this case.
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